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Persecuted, Discriminated, and 
Rejected:  The Firm Resettlement Bar 
to Colombian Refugees Living in 
Ecuador 
Luis F. Mancheno* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Recent reports produced by UNHCR and other international 
agencies indicate that Colombian refugees residing in Ecuador are 
facing new challenges in their path to safety and refuge from the 
armed conflict in Colombia. However, even though these refugees 
have presented credible claims of fear of persecution, the United 
States government has refused to allow them to resettle in the U.S. 
because these asylum seekers have already been firmly resettled in 
Ecuador. As a consequence, these Colombian nationals are unable 
to return to their country, experience harsh discrimination in their 
country of asylum, and are also legally barred from enjoying basic 
human rights in the United States. 
The firm resettlement doctrine arose from a provision of the 
Convention with Regard to the Status of Refugees of 1951. The 
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Resettlement Officer Larry Yungk for introducing this issue to me and 
providing valuable information and insight.  Thank you also to my partner, 
Eric Felleman, for his love and support.  Por último, gracias Mama, Cris y, 
Andre, por creer en mí. 
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doctrine excludes a person from receiving refugee status if it is 
shown that, prior to arrival to the country where she now seeks 
asylum, she entered a third country and received an offer of 
permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of 
permanent resettlement. 
U.S. courts have developed two approaches to the firm 
resettlement bar based on differing interpretations of the doctrinal 
phrase:  “an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some 
other type of permanent resettlement.” These are commonly referred 
to as the “formal offer” approach and the “totality of the 
circumstances” approach.  The formal approach applies a literal 
reading of the phrase, while the totality of the circumstances 
approach emphasizes that the adjudicator should consider the 
totality of the circumstances in order to decide whether an 
applicant remains in flight from persecution and unable to resettle 
in a third state that offers her rights and protections tantamount to 
those of citizenship. 
This article argues that the Department of Homeland Security 
should adopt a totality of the circumstances approach to 
interpreting the Firm Resettlement Doctrine.  Specifically, for 
Colombian refugees who have been unable to resettle in Ecuador, a 
consideration of the totality of their circumstances would allow 
them to defeat the firm resettlement bar that currently precludes 
them from being resettled in the United States. 
 
“[Ecuadorians] hear your accent and suddenly you are 
converted in their eyes from people to dirt . . . Everywhere you go 
here, the answer is no. It makes me so angry that there are so many 
Colombians in the street—refugees who can’t speak for themselves, 
denied at every turn . . .” 
 —Colombian refugee living in Ecuador1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Persecuted in Colombia, discriminated against in Ecuador, 
and rejected by the United States, Colombian refugees are still not 
 
 1.  HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES:  REFUGEE VICTIMS OF THE WAR ON TERROR 34, 
(2006) [hereinafter The Georgetown Report].  
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able to find a place that they can truly call home.  For fifty years, 
the people of Colombia have been wracked by violence caused by 
disparate factions, including government security forces and 
narco-traffickers.2  Today, approximately 396,000 Colombians 
have fled the country and have been recognized as refugees.3  The 
Ecuadorian government has recognized 60,000 of these refugees.4  
For most Colombian refugees, however, local integration into 
Ecuadorian society is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible: 
Colombians in Ecuador suffer from severe and pervasive social 
and economic discrimination and, as such, are often denied 
meaningful access to housing, employment, and education.5  For 
these reasons, many of these refugees have sought resettlement in 
the United States.  Unfortunately, they have faced an obstacle 
under U.S. law,6  as the majority of Colombian refugees have been 
denied resettlement because, according to the U.S. government, 
they were (or are) firmly resettled in Ecuador.7 
The firm resettlement doctrine arose from a provision of the 
1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.  
Under this doctrine, a person is excluded from receiving refugee 
status if it is shown that, prior to arrival to the country where she 
is seeking asylum, she entered a third country and received an 
offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type 
of permanent resettlement.8  Given that Colombian refugees have 
been granted asylum in Ecuador, they are precluded from 
resettling in the US because of the “firm resettlement bar.”  
However, due to the extreme discrimination they experience, 
Colombian asylum seekers should not be considered to be “firmly 
resettled” just because of their legal recognition and residence in 
 
 2.  Stephanie Leutert, Are Colombian Refugees Ecuador’s Scapegoats?, 
WORLD POLICY BLOG, (Dec. 14, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www. 
worldpolicy.org/blog. 
 3.  United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, 2013 UNHCR Country 
Operations Profile – Colombia, UNHRC (last visited Jan. 9, 2014), http:// 
www.unhcr.org/pages/49e492ad6.html [hereinafter UNHCR - Colombia].  
 4.  United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, 2013 UNHCR Country 
Operations Profile – Ecuador, UNHRC (last visited Jan. 9, 2014), http:// 
www.unhcr.org/pages/49e492b66.html [hereinafter UNHCR – Ecuador].  
 5.  See The Georgetown Report, supra note 1. 
 6.  8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (2007).  
 7.  See id. 
 8.  Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2006). 
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Ecuador. 
Part I of this Article will explore the firm resettlement 
doctrine and international obligations to refugees under the 1951 
United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (hereinafter “Refugee Convention”).  Part II will explore 
the United States Courts of Appeals’ split on which framework to 
employ when making firm resettlement determinations.  
Specifically, this Article will first cover the “formal offer” 
approach, holding that an applicant has firmly resettled only if 
the government of the third country has extended an offer of 
permanent residence.  Later, it will cover the “totality of the 
circumstances” approach, where evidence of a direct offer is only 
one factor to be weighed equally amongst others, including the 
length of the applicant’s stay in the third country, familial ties, 
receipt of public benefits, and business property or connections.  
Part III will briefly discuss the 2012 Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA or Board) decision in Matter of A-G-G- in an attempt 
to resolve this split, establishing a similar framework to the one 
adopted by the “formal offer” circuits.9  Part IV will acknowledge 
the current conditions that Colombian refugees in Ecuador 
endure.  Finally, Part V argues:  (1) that the issue of Colombian 
refugees residing in Ecuador perfectly demonstrates why courts 
should discontinue the “formal offer ¨approach, and (2) that use of 
the “totality of the circumstances” approach will aid Colombian 
refugees currently residing in Ecuador to be admitted as refugees 
in the U.S. 
II. A BRIEF LOOK AT COLOMBIAN REFUGEES IN ECUADOR 
Ecuador has the largest refugee population in Latin America; 
it mostly comprises of asylum seekers and refugees from 
Colombia.10  As of June 2011, Ecuador had recognized over 54,500 
Colombian refugees:  about sixty percent of them live in urban 
areas,11 while the remainder live close to the Ecuadorian-
Colombian border in underdeveloped, isolated parts of the country 
 
 9.  25 I&N Dec. 486, 504–06 (BIA 2011). 
 10.  UNHCR – Ecuador, supra note 4.   
 11.  Ana Guglielmelli White, In the shoes of refugees: providing protection 
and solutions for displaced Colombians in Ecuador 2 (New Issues in Refugee 
Research, Research Paper No. 217, 2011), available at http://www.unhcr.org 
/4e4bd6c19.pdf. 
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where there is limited infrastructure and access to services.12  In 
these insecure areas, armed groups clash—typically due to drug-
trade-related activity—and human trafficking and arms 
smuggling are rampant.13  The security situation is precarious not 
solely in the border areas but elsewhere, as many refugees report 
threats in Quito and other cities in the south of the country.14  The 
primary challenges that Colombian refugees have faced—such as 
access to employment, housing, education, and other basic 
services—are paired with the spread of discrimination and 
generally poor economic and social conditions affecting the 
Ecuadorian population.15  Due to a lack of both economic resources 
and political will, Ecuador has not been able to protect these 
refugees and provide them with conditions at least similar to the 
ones enjoyed by Ecuadorian citizens; thus, even though recognized 
as refugees in Ecuador, Colombian refugees are not enjoying the 
benefits and rights conferred under the Refugee Convention of 
1951.16 
As of December 2013, the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”)17 estimates the population 
of Colombian refugees was up to 76,830.18  Ecuador’s Constitution, 
which is strongly oriented towards human rights, recognizes the 
right to seek asylum.19 Asylum procedures are regulated by 
 
 12.  UNHCR – Ecuador, supra note 4.  
 13.  Id. 
 14.  White, supra note 11, at 5. 
 15.  Id. at 5–6. 
 16.  Id.; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 
(July 28, 1951) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
 17.  The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
was established on December 14, 1950 by the United Nations General 
Assembly.  About Us, UNHCR (last visited Jan. 10, 2014), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c2.html.  The agency is mandated to lead 
and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee 
problems worldwide.  Id.  Its primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and 
welfare of refugees.  Id.  It strives to ensure that everyone can exercise the 
right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another State, with the option to 
return home voluntarily, integrate locally or resettle in a third country; it 
also has a mandate to help stateless people.  Id. 
 18.  UNHCR, UNHCR GLOBAL APPEAL 2012-2013: ECUADOR, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4ec2310bb.html.  
 19.  UNHCR – Ecuador, supra note 4; see Georgetown University, 
Republic of Ecuador – Constitution of 2008, POLITICAL DATABASE FOR THE 
AMERICAS, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html. 
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national legislation.20  In January 2011, Ecuadorian authorities 
introduced new rules for admissibility in order to reduce the 
number of manifestly unfounded asylum claims.21 Those 
applicants not eligible for asylum have few options for appeal 
under the administrative regulation.22 In May 2012, the 
Ecuadorian Government adopted Refugee Decree 1182, removing 
the broader refugee definition contained in the Cartagena 
Declaration23 and introducing restrictive admissibility 
procedures.24  Due to the more restrictive new asylum regime in 
Ecuador, resettlement gained importance and the number of 
candidates submitted for resettlement doubled from some 800 in 
2011 to more than 1,600 in 2012.25 
In this context, many Colombian refugees are desperately 
seeking to be resettled in a third country that could provide them 
with a better system of protection and guarantees.  The United 
States, the country that takes the largest amount of refugees 
worldwide,26 has repeatedly determined that due to the status of 
 
 20.  UNHCR – Ecuador, supra note 4.  
 21.  Id.; see Stephanie Leutert, Are Colombian Refugees Ecuador's 
Scapegoats?, WORLD POLICY BLOG, (Dec. 14, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www. 
worldpolicy.org/blog/2011/12/14/are-colombian-refugees-ecuadors-scapegoats. 
 22.  UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR GLOBAL 
APPEAL 2012-2013 278, available at http://www.unhcr.org/4ec2310bb.pdf.  
 23.   
The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees is a non-binding agreement 
which was adopted by the Colloquium on the International 
Protection of Refugees in Latin America, Mexico and Panama, held 
at Cartagena, Colombia from 19-22 November 1984.  The Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees bases its principles on the “commitments 
with regards to refugees” defined in the Contadora Act on Peace and 
Cooperation (which are based on the 1951 UN Refugee Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol).  It was formulated in September 1984 and 
includes a range of detailed commitments to peace, democratization, 
regional security and economic co-operation.  It also provided for 
regional committees to evaluate and verify compliance with these 
commitments. 
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, FAHAMU REFUGEE PROGRAMME (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.refugeelegalaidinformation.org/cartagena-
declaration-refugees#sthash.Yxydlopg.dpuf.   
 24.  UNHCR – Ecuador, supra note 4. 
 25.  UNHCR, UNHCR GLOBAL REPORT 2012: ECUADOR, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/51b1d6470.html.  
 26.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2006: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 2, 54 (2006), available at 
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refugees in Ecuador, they are firmly resettled in that country and 
therefore are ineligible for resettlement in the U.S.27 
III. THE DOCTRINE OF FIRM RESETTLEMENT 
A. The International Approach to the Doctrine of Firm 
Resettlement 
The firm resettlement doctrine originates from the 
international definition of a refugee given by the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.  This Convention, increased in scope and application 
by the 1967 Protocol (together, Refugee Conventions), established 
the basic international framework for the protection of asylum 
seekers.  Article I expressly excludes from the definition of refugee 
any “person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the 
country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and 
obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality 
of that country,”28 as well as any person who, though once a 
refugee, “has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection 
of the country of his new nationality.”29  These provisions reflect 
the central intention of the Refugee Conventions: to create an 
international regime that shields persons deprived of the rights 
and protections that national citizenship ordinarily affords.  The 
legal doctrine of firm resettlement reflects the simple factual 
judgment that “[n]ational protection and status in a third country 
negate the need for international protection.”30 
However, what degree of national protection in the first 
country of asylum—in particular, which “rights and obligations”—
is sufficient to remove a person from the protection of the Refugee 
Conventions?  The UNHCR Handbook and Guidelines on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status provides 
some guidance.  A third state need not grant a person formal 
citizenship, as provided in Article I(c)(3); it is enough that he or 
she receives “most of the rights normally enjoyed by nationals,” 
which means “protection against deportation or expulsion” at a 
 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52475.pdf. 
 27.  8 C.F.R. § 208.15. 
 28.  Refugee Convention, supra note 16, at art. I(E).  
 29.  Id. at art. 1(C)(3).  
 30.  DEBORAH E. LANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 447 (3d 
ed. 1999).  
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minimum.31 
Municipal laws of state parties suggest that the Refugee 
Conventions do authorize exclusion of otherwise qualified refugees 
who have received some form of protected status in a third state, 
even if that protected status falls short of full citizenship.  South 
African law, for instance, provides that a person does not qualify 
as a refugee if “there is a reason to believe that he or she . . . 
enjoys the protection of any other country in which he or she has 
taken residence.”32  Article I(E) does “not require that the 
individuals in question . . . enjoy the full range of rights incidental 
to citizenship. Given the fundamental objective of protection, 
however, the right of entry to the State and freedom from removal 
are to be considered essential.”33  On the other hand, Article I(E) 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention has been subjected to a far more 
expansive interpretation.  One court in Canada, for example, held 
that it also encompasses the right to social services.34  Beyond 
this, international law provides little guidance about the nature 
and extent of the national protection and rights acquired by 
Article I(E). 
B. U.S. Approach to Firm Resettlement 
United States statutes are patterned on the Refugee 
Conventions’ two-tiered analysis: persons who meet the definition 
of “refugee” are entitled to protection, unless they are barred by an 
exception, such as firm resettlement.35  To obtain asylum, a 
person must first prove he or she is a refugee.36  The U.S. defines 
 
 31.  UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING 
REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL 
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES ¶¶ 144–45 (2011), [hereinafter UNHCR 
Handbook]. 
 32.  Refugees Act 130 of 1998 ch. 1(4) (S. Afr.).  
 33.  GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (2d 
ed. 1996). 
 34.  See Hamdan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), 38 
Imm. L.R. (2d) 20 [1997] (F.C.T.D) (holding that the “rights and obligations” 
referred to by Article 1(E) of the Refugee Convention also include the rights 
to work and to receive social services).  
 35.  Refugee Convention, supra note 16, at art. 1(E). 
 36.  Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006); 
see also Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 161 (3d. Cir. 1998) (noting 
that it is plaintiff’s burden to show that she qualifies as a refugee in order to 
seek asylee status). 
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a refugee as: 
[a]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s 
nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return 
to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself 
or the protection of, that country because of persecution 
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.37 
Once a person’s refugee status is determined, the government 
may present evidence that statutory provisions bar the refugee’s 
asylum claim. These include firm resettlement, criminal 
conviction, commission of serious non-political crimes, terrorist 
activities, or other dangers to national security.38  These statutory 
bars mirror those set forth in the Refugee Conventions.39 
Firm resettlement is established as a bar to asylum by 
statute,40 but it is defined by federal regulations.41  Federal 
regulations consider a refugee firmly resettled if it is shown that, 
“prior to arrival in the United States,” he or she entered a third 
country and “received an offer of permanent resident status, 
citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement.”42  The 
applicant may contest this result in two ways.  First, by 
demonstrating “[t]hat his or her entry into that country was a 
necessary consequence of his or her flight from persecution, that 
he or she remained in that country only as was necessary to 
arrange onward travel, and that he or she did not establish 
significant ties in that country.”43  Alternatively, an applicant may 
rebut the presumption by showing “[t]hat the conditions of his or 
her residence in that nation were so substantially and consciously 
restricted by the authority of the country or refuge that he or she 
was not in fact resettled.”44  On its face, 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b) is 
disjunctive and permits two forms of rebuttal: on temporal 
grounds, by showing that the settlement was brief and “in flight;” 
 
 37.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 
 38.  8 U.S.C. § 1101 (b)(2)(A). 
 39.  Refugee Convention, supra note 16, at arts. 1(E), 1(F).  
 40.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv).  
 41.  8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (2007).  
 42.  Id.  
 43.  8 C.F.R. § 208.15(a).  
 44.  8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b). 
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or on grounds of unacceptable conditions, by showing that the 
third country was unsuitable for permanent resettlement. 
In making this latter inquiry into whether the third country 
was suitable for permanent resettlement, federal regulations 
require that the adjudicator, 
consider the conditions under which other residents of the 
country live; the type of housing, whether permanent or 
temporary, made available to the refugee; the types and 
extent of employment available to the refugee; and the 
extent to which the refugee received permission to hold 
property and to enjoy other rights and privileges, such as 
travel documentation that includes a right of entry or 
reentry, education, public relief, or naturalization, 
ordinarily, available to other residents in the country.45 
It is notable that 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b) asks the adjudicator to 
compare the conditions under which the refugee lived in the third 
country to those of native citizens in the third country.  The 
purpose of the statute becomes clear when viewed alongside the 
Refugee Conventions: these provisions reflect the Conventions’ 
requirement that host countries treat refugees and citizens 
equally.46  Neither the Convention nor 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (nor any 
other U.S. law, for that matter) permit a refugee to seek protection 
in the U.S. on grounds that the economic, social, or political 
conditions in the U.S. are better for the refugee than in the third 
country.  The statute directs the judge to ask whether the refugee 
experienced equal treatment within the third country, and not 
whether there is equal treatment between the third country and 
The United States.47  Thus, the often-stated concern about 
providing a back door to economic migrants when modifying the 
firm resettlement doctrine is misplaced.48  The purpose of this 
regulation is to determine whether the refugee was afforded rights 
equivalent to those of a citizen of the third country—however 
impoverished, undemocratic, or limited those citizen’s 
 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id.; Refugee Convention, supra note 16, arts. 16, 17, 20–24 (requiring 
that signatories award refugees and citizens equal treatment before the law, 
access to gainful employment, and welfare, respectively). 
 47.  8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b) (“[T]he asylum officer or immigration judge shall 
consider the conditions under which other residents of the country live . . .”).  
 48.  See id. 
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circumstances are. In the U.S., courts inquire into firm 
resettlement before inquiring into refugee status for the sake of 
efficiency.  However, it is important to note that firm resettlement 
only affects meritorious applications for asylum.  An applicant 
who cannot meet the definition of a refugee, including evidentiary 
standards such as credible fear of persecution on a protected 
ground, will not achieve asylum or withholding, regardless of the 
status of the firm resettlement doctrine.49 For instance, if 
resettlement were removed entirely as a bar to asylum, economic 
migrants would still be barred from the asylum system because 
they would not fulfill the definition of a refugee.50 
C. U.S. Jurisprudence 
Federal courts have developed two approaches to the firm 
resettlement bar based on differing interpretations of the phrase 
“an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other 
type of permanent resettlement.”51 The two approaches are 
commonly referred to as the formal offer approach, adopted by the 
Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits,52 and the totality of 
 
 49.  The dialogue surrounding firm resettlement is often charged with 
concerns about increasing numbers of asylum seekers or opening the asylum 
system to economic migrants.  See, e.g., Sarah Lynne Campbell, Note, Give 
Me Your Tired, Your Poor, And Your Country Shoppers, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 
377, 390–94 (2007) (arguing that “asylum may be used as a backdoor way to 
get legalized presence in the United States” and suggesting that applicants 
for asylum can “create an undue burden on the U.S. economy” in the same 
way as undocumented illegal immigrants).  These concerns may have some 
merit regarding expanding the grounds for asylum – for example, whether it 
should be expanded to include persecution based on gender or economic 
status—but they are not relevant to the issue of the firm resettlement bar.  
This dialogue overlooks the fact that the resettlement inquiry comes after the 
court finds that the applicant has a legitimate claim for asylum.  An economic 
migrant, who does not qualify for asylum, will never be subjected to the firm 
resettlement inquiry.  See generally 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. 
 50.  See UNHCR Handbook, supra note 31. The UNHCR Handbook 
specifically advises that economic migrants are not refugees.  See id. at ¶¶ 62, 
64 (“If [an applicant] is moved exclusively by economic considerations, he is 
an economic migrant and not a refugee . . . Objections to general economic 
measures are not themselves good reasons for claiming refugee status”).  
 51.  8 C.F.R. § 208.15; see Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 484–85 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (distinguishing between the two approaches). 
 52.  See, e.g., Diallo v Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 701 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that a refugee who lived and worked in Ethiopia for five years but never 
received permanent status was not firmly resettled); Id. at 694–95 (rejecting 
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circumstances approach, followed by the Second, Fourth, Eighth, 
Tenth, and D.C. Circuits.53  The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have 
not yet addressed the issue and the First Circuit has reserved the 
issue “for future decision.”54  Additionally, in 2011 in an attempt 
to resolve the split between Circuits, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) issued a precedential opinion in the case Matter of 
A-G-G, which established a four-step framework that largely 
follows the formal offer approach to the firm resettlement 
analysis.55 
1. The Formal Offer Approach 
The formal offer approach applies a literal reading of the 
phrase “received an offer of permanent resident status, 
citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement.”56  In 
an important leading case, Abdille v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit 
focused on cases which fall into this last “other type of permanent 
resettlement” category: 
We conclude that the plain language of § 208.15 makes 
 
“the now out-dated ‘totality of the circumstances’ analysis”); Abdille, 242 F.3d 
at 486 (adopting the formal offer approach); Maharaj v. Gonzalez, 450 F.3d 
961, 964 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (“[W]e align ourselves with Judge Becker's 
leading opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Abdille v. 
Ashcroft . . .).  
 53.  See, e.g., Sall v. Gonzalez, 437 F.3d 229, 233–35 (2nd Cir. 2005) (per 
curiam) (acknowledging the persuavesiness of the “reasoning of those circuits 
that have applied the ‘totality of circumstances’ test,” but emphasizing the 
“particular importance . . . of whether he actually received an offer of 
permanent resident status”).  This emphasis in Sall somewhat undermines 
the Court’s avowed support for the “totality of the circumstances” approach.  
See Mussie v. INS, 172 F.3d 329, 331–32 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming a finding 
of firm resettlement in part based on staying in another country for six years, 
receiving government assistance, and renting a personal apartment); Abdalla 
v. INS, 43 F.3d 1397, 1400 (10th Cir. 1994) (considering the role of family ties 
in the firm resettlement analysis); Farbakhash v. INS, 20 F.3d 877, 881 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (listing factors relevant to determination of firm resettlement, such 
as family ties and business or property connections) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Chinese Am. Civil Council v. Att’y Gen., 566 F.2d 321, 326 
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding Chinese asylum applicants had firmly resettled 
during a lengthy stay in Hong Kong).  
 54.  Salazar v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 45, 50 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 55.  25 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 2011). 
 56.  8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (2007); see also Abdille, 242 F.3d at 485 (“Our 
principal guide in [interpreting the phrase] is the language and structure of 8 
C.F.R. § 208.15, the INS’s own definition of firm resettlement”). 
MANCHENOFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2014  6:02 PM 
2014]  PERSECUTED, DISCRIMINATED, AND REJECTED 163 
clear that the prime factor in the firm resettlement 
inquiry is the existence of an offer of permanent resident 
status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent 
resettlement . . . [W]e reject an alternative “totality of the 
alien’s circumstances” approach that would have us 
consider the existence of an offer as simply one 
component of a broader firm resettlement inquiry 
according equal weight to such non-offer based factors as 
the alien’s length of stay in a third country, the economic 
and social ties that the alien develops in that country, 
and the alien’s intent to make that country his 
permanent home.57 
In a later decision, the Ninth Circuit required either “direct 
evidence of an offer issued by the third country’s government or, 
where no direct evidence of a formal government offer is 
obtainable, by circumstantial evidence of sufficient force to 
indicate that the third country officially sanctions the alien’s 
indefinite-presence.”58 
Under the formal offer approach, the protection must be 
explicit and specific:  unofficial practices, such as tolerance of 
unregistered immigrants or systematic non-enforcement 
deportation, cannot constitute permanent resettlement. For 
example, in Ali v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit rejected the BIA’s 
findings that a refugee, Deqa Ahmad Haji Ali, was firmly resettled 
in Ethiopia.59  The BIA based its determination on the fact that 
Ali had lived and worked in Ethiopia for five years, “chose not to 
live in refugee camps,” and “was never bothered by the 
authorities.”60  Reversing this finding, the Ninth Circuit held that 
“the fact that Ali fortuitously evaded detection by the government 
while living illegally in Ethiopia does not allow for a finding that 
Ali was firmly resettled in Ethiopia.”61  Although Ali had created a 
life in Ethiopia, established familial and social ties there, and was 
 
 57.  Abdille, 242 F.3d at 480 (finding that a Somali refuge who had lived 
in South Africa on temporary asylum status, which would expire after two 
years, had not firmly resettled). 
 58.  Maharaj v. Gonzalez, 450 F.3d 961, 964 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 
(emphasis added). 
 59.  Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 789–91 (9th Cir. 2005).  
 60.  Id. at 784. 
 61.  Id. at 790. 
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not literally “in flight”—conditions which might qualify her for 
firm resettlement under the “totality of the circumstances” 
approach—she did not have any legal right to work or stay in 
Ethiopia and lived under the constant threat of deportation.  A 
similar case in the Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion.62 
Under the formal offer approach, courts have recognized that 
the possibility of an offer in a third country is not the same as an 
offer itself.63  A refugee who reaches a third country, applies for 
asylum, and is given temporary leave to remain there while 
awaiting the outcome of his application has not firmly resettled.  
Rather, his residency is subject to revocation at any time.  He has 
no concrete assurance that his asylum application will eventually 
be granted.  Similarly, a refugee like Ali, who lives and works 
illegally for a long period of time in a third country, “cannot obtain 
official resident status no matter his length of stay, his intent, or 
the extent of the familial and economic connections he develops.”64  
The Totality of the Circumstances Approach 
The totality of the circumstances approach is a long-standing 
test for firm resettlement that predates both the Refugee Act of 
1980 and other federal regulations.65  At the time the Refugee Act 
was enacted, courts considered Congress’ intent to be “the creation 
of a safe haven for refugees still in flight from persecution, not 
those already settled and rebuilding their lives elsewhere.”66  
Although the doctrine has evolved as the statutory regime has 
changed, the approach continues to emphasize “that the 
adjudicator should consider the totality of the circumstances in 
order to decide whether an applicant remains in flight from 
persecution and unable to resettle in a third state that offers her 
rights and protections tantamount to those of citizenship.”67  This 
 
 62.  Diallo v Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 701 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a 
refugee who lived and worked in Ethiopia for five years but never received 
permanent status was not firmly resettled). 
 63.  Maharaj, 450 F.3d at 977–79. 
 64.  See, e.g., id. at 977 (“[T]he fact that Canada offers a process for 
applying for some type of refugee or asylum status is not the same as offering 
the status itself”). 
 65.  Robert D. Sloane, An Offer of Firm Resettlement, 36 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L. L. REV. 47, 51 (2004) (“[W]ell before the United States implemented the 
1967 Protocol in 1980" the doctrine “evolved in a series of decisions by the 
Board of Immigration Appeals in the late 1960s.”). 
 66.  Id. at 52.  
 67.  Id. at 56.  
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focus on “flight” leads a court to examine whether the refugee’s 
physical presence “in the United States is . . . reasonably 
proximate to the flight and not one following a flight remote in 
point of time or interrupted by an intervening residence in a third 
country reasonably constituting a termination of the original 
flight in search of refuge.”68  Consequently, the totality of the 
circumstances approach favors refugees who take shorter, more 
direct routes to the United States.  Courts following the totality of 
the circumstances approach will 
consider the existence of a government-issued offer as 
simply one component of a broader firm resettlement 
inquiry according to equal weight to such factors as the 
alien’s length of stay in a third country, the economic and 
social ties that the alien develops in that country, and the 
alien’s intent[.]69 
Under this approach, no explicit offer of permanent protection 
is required.70  Neither does the court consider whether the refugee 
has the right to return to the third country where he previously 
resided.  For example, prior to its adoption of the formal approach, 
the Ninth Circuit applied the totality of the circumstances test in 
Cheo v INS.71  The Court upheld the immigration judge’s finding 
of firm resettlement where the petitioners, the Cheos, after fleeing 
their native Cambodia, had lived in Malaysia for three years 
without any molestation or persecution and “were not fleeing 
danger when they came to this country.”72  The government 
presented no evidence to show whether the Cheos had a right to 
return to Malaysia or whether their three-year stay was legal.73  
Nevertheless, an offer of permanent legal residency was not 
necessary: “[t]hree years of peaceful residence established that the 
 
 68.  Farbakhsh v. INS., 20 F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir 1994) (quoting In re 
Soleimani, 20 I.&N Dec. 99, 106 (B.I.A. 1989)). 
 69.  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 2001) (emphasis 
added).  Courts may also consider the government assistance given to the 
refugee, travel or identity documents issued, educational opportunities, and 
family ties to the country.  See id. 
 70.  Id. at 485 (reviewing the leading totality of the circumstances cases 
and noting that “no explicit mention of the [formal] issuance of an offer of 
permanent resettlement” was required). 
 71.  Cheo v. INS, 162 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 72.  Id. at 1228 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73.  Id. at 1229. 
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ground of ‘firm resettlement’ in Malaysia might apply,” shifting 
the burden of rebuttal to the Cheos.74  “Critically, therefore, Cheo 
concluded that other facts besides the existence of an ‘offer’ can 
show firm resettlement.”75 
2. The BIA Approach after Matter of A-G-G- 
In 2011, the BIA attempted to resolve the circuit split by 
incorporating a new mandatory regime in the application of “firm 
resettlement” through its opinion in Matter of A-G-G-.76  The 
applicant in this case was a Mauritanian citizen who had been 
arrested, beaten, and detained by Mauritanian soldiers in 1990.77  
This applicant was eventually forcibly deported to Senegal after 
being inadequately fed and forced to work as a slave in a camp in 
Mauritania.78  The applicant lived in Senegal for the following 
eight years, when he married a Senegalese citizen, had two 
children, worked, and “received an identification number in the 
Senegalese Government’s registry of foreigners.”79  In 1999, the 
applicant left Senegal and arrived in the U.S. where he 
affirmatively applied for asylum.80 The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (“INS”) denied his application and placed 
him in removal proceedings, where he renewed his application 
before the immigration judge.81  The immigration judge granted 
his application, determining that he was credible, had a well-
founded fear of future persecution, and had not firmly resettled in 
Senegal.82 
Acknowledging the fact that the BIA had not yet issued a 
decision setting forth the proper framework to apply to firm 
resettlement determinations under current law, the BIA used 
Matter of A-G-G- to set forth a framework that involves a four-step 
analysis and follows exclusively on the existence of an offer.83  
Under the first step, the government bears the burden of 
 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Maharaj v. Gonzalez, 450 F.3d 961, 984 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).  
 76.  25 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 2011). 
 77.  Id. at 487. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See id. at 487–88. 
 83.  Id. at 501. 
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presenting prima facie evidence that the applicant has received an 
offer for firm resettlement.84  To carry this burden, the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
should first secure and produce direct evidence of 
governmental documents indicating an alien’s ability to 
stay in a country indefinitely. Such documents may 
include evidence of refugee status, a passport, a travel 
document, or other evidence indicative of permanent 
residence . . . [If that type of evidence is not available,] 
indirect evidence may be used to show that an offer of 
firm resettlement has been made if it has sufficient level 
of clarity and force to establish that an alien is able to 
permanently reside in the country.85 
Such indirect evidence may include: 
the immigration laws or refugees process of the country of 
proposed resettlement; the length of the alien’s stay in a 
third country; the alien’s intent to settle in the country; 
family ties and business or property connections; the 
extent of social and economic ties; . . . and whether the 
alien had legal rights normally given to people who have 
some official status, such as the right to work and enter 
and exit the country.86 
Furthermore, the BIA noted that DHS could meet its burden 
of proof under this prong by just showing the existence of the 
“legal mechanism” in the third country that would allow the alien 
to receive permanent residence, even if the applicant had not 
exercised that mechanism.87 
In the second step of the Board’s firm resettlement 
framework, the alien can rebut the Government’s prima facie 
evidence of an offer of firm resettlement by “showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that such an offer has not, in fact, 
 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 501–02. 
 86.  Id. at 502. 
 87.  Id.  See also Bonilla v. Mukasey, 539 F.3d 72, 81 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(observing that when an alien is entitled to maintain the resident status 
permanently as long as it is renewed, firm resettlement should bar the alien 
from receiving asylum if the renewal of a resident stamp is an administrative 
requirement as routine as renewing one’s passport).  
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been made or that he or she would not qualify for it.”88  The Board 
added that the alien’s rebuttal may include evidence regarding 
how a law granting permanent residence to an alien is actually 
applied and why the alien would not be eligible to remain in the 
country in an official status.89 
Under the third step, the immigration judge considers the 
totality of the evidence presented by the parties and determines 
whether the alien has rebutted the evidence of firm resettlement 
presented by DHS.90  That is, if the immigration judge finds that 
the alien has not rebutted DHS’s evidence, the immigration judge 
will find the alien firmly resettled. 
The final step is taken only if the immigration judge has 
determined that the applicant is firmly resettled. After this 
determination, the burden shifts back to the applicant to 
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she is 
eligible for asylum under one of the two exceptions to the firm 
resettlement bar.91 
IV. DETERMINING WHETHER COLOMBIAN REFUGEES ARE 
FIRMLY RESETTLED IN ECUADOR 
For Colombians who have been recognized as refugees in 
Ecuador, the “formal offer” approach is barring them from being 
resettled in the U.S. because of the “formal offer” they receive 
from the Ecuadorian government.  In fact, the situation of 
Colombian refugees makes the perfect case for doing away with 
the rigid “formal offer” approach and instead opting for the more 
humane approach adopted by the “totality of the circumstances” 
circuits. 
If DHS and the “formal offer” approach circuits were to adopt 
the “totality of the circumstances” approach, they would look 
beyond the legal recognition that Colombian refugees have 
received in Ecuador and instead would focus on their living 
conditions.92  This would include: the conditions in which a 
Colombian refugee lives in Ecuador compared to the living 
 
 88.  25 I&N Dec. 486, 503 (BIA 2011). 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id.  See also infra note 125.  
 92.  See generally, Sall v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2006); see also 
Mussie v. INS, 172 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 1999). 
MANCHENOFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/5/2014  6:02 PM 
2014]  PERSECUTED, DISCRIMINATED, AND REJECTED 169 
conditions of the local population; socioeconomic indicators such as 
access to fundamental services, education for children, access to 
work, and access to property ownership; psychosocial indicators 
such as the refugee’s past history of persecution and 
circumstances of flight; efforts made on part of the refugee to 
improve his or her situation; and existence of pervasive 
discrimination in the host country based on the refugee’s social, 
cultural or socioeconomic profile.93 
In 2006, a team of thirteen researchers from Georgetown 
University Law Center with the collaboration of UNHCR Ecuador 
conducted a fact-finding mission regarding the living conditions of 
Colombian refugees in three different Ecuadorian cities.94  A 
report about this research was published in May of 2006, and 
although slightly dated today, it found issues identical to the ones 
that organizations such as Asylum Access Ecuador95 and UNHCR 
Ecuador,96 reported in 2012.97  The findings in this report clearly 
reflect an inability of Colombian refugees to find safety and enjoy 
living conditions similar to the ones in which their Ecuadorian 
counterparts live. Each one of the instances of abuse, 
discrimination, and lack of legal protection that Colombian 
refugees continually face constitutes a reason why many of these 
refugees should not be considered “firmly resettled” in Ecuador 
and is evidence of the lack of practicality and effectiveness of the 
“formal offer” approach.  Each one of those instances explains why 
the rigid “formal offer” approach is a system that cannot be 
maintained in light of the U.S. international obligations under the 
Refugee Convention. 
A.  Findings Made by The Georgetown Report in Ecuador 
The Georgetown Report found that although they retain 
 
 93.  Id.; see also UNHCR Handbook,  supra note 31, at ¶¶. 4.9.2–4.9.5. 
 94.  The Georgetown Report, supra note 1.  
 95.  See Adina Appelbaum, Challenges to Refugee Protection in Ecuador: 
Reflections from World Refugee Day, GEORGETOWN PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW, 
June 2012, available at http://gppreview.com/2012/06/26/challenges-to-
refugee-protection-in-ecuador-reflections-from-world-refugee-day/. 
 96.  See UNHCR, UNHCR GLOBAL REPORT: ECUADOR 2011, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4fc880c1a.html.  
 97.  See id.  Therefore, the data collected by this report is currently 
useful when determining whether, under U.S. law today, a Colombian 
refugee would be considered firmly resettled or not in Ecuador.  See id. 
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asylum status, many Colombian refugees continue to be prevented 
from obtaining access to education, housing, and medical care.98  
In addition to this restricted access, female refugees reported 
having been victims of sexual abuse and exploitation.99  The 
report also found indicators of pervasive institutional 
discrimination and prejudice against Colombians: Colombian 
refugees expressed feelings of insecurity and isolation within their 
host communities.100  Of the forty-nine refugees interviewed by 
the Georgetown Fact Finding Group, ten percent of them were 
being referred to the UNHCR Resettlement Program because they 
lacked legal protection in Ecuador; forty-three percent were 
referred because of security risks; and another twenty-three 
percent were referred because of lack of local integration 
problems: because they were considered to be women at risk, or 
because of serious medical needs.101 
Additionally, while the Ecuadorian Government has taken 
significant steps to provide protection to refugees, Colombian 
refugees struggle to access basic rights that their Ecuadorian 
counterparts enjoy: 
[M]any recognized refugees expressed that their 
situations had not improved, or improved only slightly 
after a grant of refugee status. They complained of 
pervasive and systematic discrimination, lack of job 
opportunities, inability to find landlords willing to rent to 
Colombians, lack of educational opportunities for their 
children, inability to open bank accounts, police 
harassment and abuse, general deficiency of services and 
protection for recognized refugees, and a constant 
prejudice against Colombians.102 
Furthermore, the barriers to basic rights were also related to the 
spread of discrimination against Colombians, discrimination that 
 
 98.  The Georgetown Report, supra note 1, at 38–39. 
 99.  Id. at 42. “Colombian women are a particularly vulnerable 
population.  A significant number are forced into prostitution and there are 
reports that the same people involved in trafficking drugs across the border 
are also involved in trafficking women and children.”  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 34.  
 102.  Id. at 38. 
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particularly affects Afro-Colombians and indigenous people.103  
The integration process takes place in a context dominated by 
profound economic and ethnic segregation.104 
Colombian refugees described, in the Georgetown Report, how 
discrimination affects them on a daily basis, particularly in their 
access to employment and housing.105  Fifty-two percent of the 
refugees surveyed felt discriminated against in Ecuador, 
specifically in relation to negative perceptions connected to 
nationality, gender, sexual orientation, refugee status, ethnicity 
and socioeconomic situation.106  Moreover, public spaces were 
identified as the place where most refugees experienced 
discrimination, followed by the workplace, public institutions, and 
places of residence.107 
According to the report, many Colombian refugees mentioned 
that when looking for housing or jobs they often hear, “[w]e do not 
hire Colombians,” or “[w]e do not rent to Colombians.”108  These 
situations reduce the employment opportunities available to 
refugees, increase abuse from employers toward women and 
minorities (who are typically targets of even more discrimination), 
 
 103.  Id. at 44.  “Afro-Colombians expressed particular concern for the 
prejudicial treatment that their children were face to endure. [One of the 
interviewees] complained that her seven year old son ha[d] been called racist 
epithets at school and had experienced harassment, badgering, taunting, and 
name calling on the street.”  Id.  
 104.  Id. at 43. 
 105.  Id. at 40. “Twelve refugees described instances in which their 
employer refused to pay them or delayed payment. In these circumstances 
they had no legal recourse.”  Id.  Furthermore, “housing discrimination and 
predatory landlords also proved a persistent problem, relegating many 
Colombian refugees to several dilapidated neighborhoods in the cities of 
Quito and Ibara and camp life in Lago Agrio.”  Id. at 40.  
 106.  See id. 
 107.  Id. at 38.   
[A Colombian refugee] related various incidences of discrimination, 
lack of physical security and general difficulty with local integration.  
[The Colombian refugee] said that there is an omnipresence of 
prejudice: “to them we are thieves and murderers.”  He asserted that 
his family had been ostracized—“even at church.”  [Two Colombian 
refugees] ha[d] been denied apartments because of their nationality.  
They were particularly disturbed that Ecuadorians seem to associate 
them with the armed groups when they were actually the victims of 
these groups. 
   Id. at 38.  
 108.  Id. at 40. 
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and can become a serious barrier to integration. Housing 
discrimination and predatory landlords also proved to be a 
persistent problem.  These landlords relegate many Colombian 
refugees to several dilapidated neighborhoods in the cities in the 
Ecuadorian Andes and to life in refugee camps close to the 
Colombian border.109  One refugee recalled multiple landlords 
telling her that the apartment she was seeking had already been 
rented, although she knew otherwise.110  The living conditions in 
the neighborhoods where many Colombian refugees can find 
shelter are inadequate: while pregnant with her first child, one 
refugee interviewed by the Georgetown team said she lived in one 
room in a small house with four other adults, and the room had 
neither a kitchen nor a bathroom.111 
At the same time, discrimination can have a profound 
consequence on refugees’ own self-perception.  Discrimination is 
also expressed by verbal abuse on the streets, and in some cases, 
with physical violence.  Women and children are particularly 
vulnerable to those situations.  Refugees expressed that the 
discrimination in Ecuador makes them feel “without dignity” or as 
“useless or not worthy.”112 
Discrimination and xenophobia worsened when other 
dimensions such as race, gender and nationality are added (e.g. 
Afro-Colombian women). Accounts describe many instances of 
xenophobic treatment perpetrated by actors including even the 
authorities and the police: “in the northeastern region of Ecuador, 
there are frequent reports of xenophobic and discriminatory 
treatment of Colombians by Ecuadorians, including harassment 
and arrest by police forces.”113 Many refugees reported that 
Ecuadorians stereotype Colombian refugees in two ways: men are 
categorized as guerilla members or drug traffickers, and women 
are categorized as prostitutes.114  Accounts also describe many 
other challenges faced by Columbian refugees: 
“[a]part from the challenges to access of employment and 
housing, many Colombian refugees encounter barriers to 
 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id.  
 113.  White, supra note 11, at 6. 
 114.  Id.  
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access education for their children (particularly for 
teenagers), to the banking system, and to health services.  
While the government of Ecuador guarantees access to 
healthcare and education, in reality many refugees face 
many bureaucratic hurdles and requirements that 
impede access to schools for many children.”115 
Additionally, Colombian refugees living in the border regions 
are often impacted by the lack of security and violence and other 
dangerous crimes in those areas.116  For instance, these refugees 
naturally do not know whom (among local officials) to trust, 
because paramilitaries and guerillas are present in Ecuador.117  
For many refugees who face secondary persecution in Ecuador, the 
persecution is linked to the persecution they suffered in 
Colombia.118  For others, even though the persecution does not 
appear to be linked to the persecution they faced in Colombia, 
their new persecution involves the same actors.119   These refugees 
also lack trust towards the Ecuadorian armed forces and police 
who, in many instances, are the perpetrators of outright 
 
 115.  Id.   
UNHCR estimate that only twenty-five per-cent of the school aged 
children of recognized refugees have access to education and are able 
to attend local schools. Despite an official commitment by the 
Ecuadorian government to allow recognized refugees to attend local 
schools, no government action has been taken to prevent local school 
districts from barring Colombian children from matriculation.  
The Georgetown Report, supra note 1, at 40. 
 116.  White, supra note 11, at 7 (“Ecuador’s border cities, and other 
localities that host a large number of refugees, are characterized by high 
levels of violence and crime, drug trafficking, arms smuggling and a high 
concentration of brothels.”). 
 117.  Both Colombian paramilitaries and guerrilla groups operate within 
Ecuador, trafficking in drugs and arms and crossing back and forth over the 
border with ease.  See generally International Crisis Group, Colombian 
Borders: The Weak Link in Uribe’s Security Policy (Sept. 2004).  
 118.  See The Georgetown Report, supra note 1.  “Irregular and armed 
groups have targeted certain refugees as ‘military objectives,’ offering 
bounties for the assassination or kidnapping of Colombian civilians who have 
crossed into Ecuador.”  Id. at 36–37. 
 119.  According to one of the refugees interviewed by the Georgetown 
Report, he encountered members of a Colombian irregular armed group at a 
refugee agency in Ecuador.  Id. at 37.  They extorted from him, threatened to 
kill him, intimidated his family, and warned him that if he did not fulfill 
their demands, they would tell his Colombian persecutors that they had 
located him.  Id. at 37. 
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brutalities.120 
Furthermore, the Georgetown Report found that women and 
girls among this population are exposed to a high risk of sexual 
and gender based violence.121  The Report stated that:   
Women and girls from minority groups are in an even 
greater vulnerable situation. There is a greater need to 
provide protection and programs that focus on [sexual 
and gender based violence (“SGBV”)], particularly in 
areas in the border region. The lack of prevention, 
protection and prosecution of SGBV cases is prevalent.122 
Finally, the report brought to light survival stories of sex 
trafficking and abuse of minors in the refugee population, the 
presence of which create a difficult context in which to work 
toward the prevention of SGBV.123 
V. RESETTLING COLOMBIAN REFUGEES FROM ECUADOR TO 
THE UNITED STATES 
A. Colombian Refugees in The United States Program 
As discussed supra, the need for the legal and physical 
protection of Colombian refugees in Ecuador is urgent.  Although 
 
 120.   
The lack of police protection for persecuted Colombians exacerbates 
their secondary persecution. Many refugees described intimidation 
or abuse in the hands of the Ecuadorian police, which made them 
unable or unwilling to report incidents of abuse. One of the refugees 
females interviewed by the Georgetown Report explained that while 
she was working at a restaurant, a police officer stopped by and 
asked her to “help him” with social favors, and threatened to deport 
her if she didn’t comply. 
   Id. at 37–38. 
 121.   
Sexual exploitation by Colombian and Ecuadorians was a recurring 
and insidious problem for the womem . . . the single or widowed 
refugee women interviewed described instances of sexual 
exploitation, inappropriate sexual behavior by authorities, rape and 
sexual assault, or forced prostitution in Ecuador.  Some married 
women and their husbands also complained of the climate of sexual 
exploitation and discrimination facing Colombian women and girls in 
Ecuador. 
   Id. at 42. 
 122.  Id. at 44. 
 123.  Id. at 42–44. 
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the Ecuadorian government continues to make efforts to address 
this urgent need, Colombian refugees are still precluded from 
enjoying the same rights that their Ecuadorian counterparts do.  
Unfortunately, despite the fact that living conditions of Colombian 
refugees have not improved in the past decade, the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) has prevented more and more 
Colombian refugees from being resettled in the U.S. because they 
have considered them to be “firmly resettled” in Ecuador.  This is 
evidenced when one compares the number of Colombian refugees 
admitted to the U.S. in 2004 and in 2009.124  The U.S. government 
admitted ten times fewer Colombian Refugees in 2009 than in 
2004.125   
“Firm resettlement” continues to be the bar that precludes 
Colombians from resettlement in the United States. DHS’s 
interpretation of U.S. law has provided only narrow grounds for a 
waiver of the firm resettlement bar.  More restrictive than the 
UNHCR guidelines, DHS’s administrative regulations define an 
individual as firmly resettled if another country offered her 
permanent status prior to her entry into the U.S.126 The 
 
 124.  The highest number of Colombian refugees admitted by the U.S. was 
in fiscal year 2004, with a total of 577 refugees.  US DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS A1 (2009), available at https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files 
/orr/fy_2009_annual_report_to_congress.pdf.  However, from 2004 to 2009 the 
admission numbers declined.  Id.  In 2009, the U.S. only admitted 54 
Colombian refugees.  Id.  
 125.  Id.  
 126.  8 C.F.R. § 208.15.  This statute reads:  “An alien is considered to be 
firmly resettled if, prior to arrival in the United States, he or she entered into 
another country with, or while in that country received, an offer of permanent 
resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement 
unless he or she establishes: 
(a) That his or her entry into that country was a necessary 
consequence of his or her flight from persecution, that he or she 
remained in that country only as long as was necessary to 
arrange onward travel, and that he or she did not establish 
significant ties in that country; or 
(b) That the conditions of his or her residence in that country 
were so substantially and consciously restricted by the authority 
of the country of refuge that he or she was not in fact resettled. 
In making his or her determination, the asylum officer or 
immigration judge shall consider the conditions under which 
other residents of the country live; the type of housing, whether 
permanent or temporary, made available to the refugee; the 
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regulations allow a waiver of the firm resettlement bar in narrow 
circumstances, only if the individual’s conditions in her first 
country of asylum are “so substantially and consciously restricted 
by the authority of the country that he or she was not in fact 
resettled.”127 In determining whether conditions are sufficiently 
restricted (despite legal recognition in her country of asylum) to 
allow a refugee to be resettled, the U.S. considers the individual’s 
housing situation, prospects and extent of employment, and 
enjoyment of basic rights.128  However, DHS has permitted the 
waiver of firm resettlement to apply to significantly fewer refugees 
who genuinely lack prospects of local integration and who clearly 
need to resettle.129  Due to the effect of the restrictive firm 
resettlement bar, most Colombian refugees in serious need of 
third country resettlement are prohibited from resettling in the 
U.S., which can, in turn, delay their resettlement to a third 
country. 
B. The “totality of the circumstances” approach consistency with 
the United States’ International Obligations under the Refugee 
Convention and its Domestic Asylum System 
The circuits that follow the “formal offer” approach, and 
recently the BIA, have stated that one of the main reasons for 
adopting such a framework is the inconsistency between the 
“totality of the circumstances” approach and U.S. obligations 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention.130   These obligations, as they 
relate to firm resettlement, flow from two parts of the Convention.  
The first part is the firm resettlement clause itself, which provides 
that the “Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized 
by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken 
residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached 
 
types and extent of employment available to the refugee; and the 
extent to which the refugee received permission to hold property 
and to enjoy other rights and privileges, such as travel 
documentation that includes a right of entry or reentry, 
education, public relief, or naturalization, ordinarily available to 
others resident in the country.”  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  See The Georgetown Report, supra note 1. 
 130.  See David Norris, Total[ity] Recall: Firm Resettlement 
Determinations After In Re A-G-G-, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 425, 441 (2012).  
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to the possession of the nationality of that country.”131  The plain 
language of this clause demonstrates that under the Convention, a 
refugee should be considered firmly resettled only when the 
country where he has taken residency has provided him with the 
same rights and obligations that the country provides to citizens 
or permanent residents in that country.  The existence of a 
“formal offer” is only the beginning of the inquiry that the 
adjudicator has to make when determining firm resettlement. 
The protection of refugees against refoulement132 has also 
been argued by proponents of the “formal offer” approach as a 
benefit of the approach.133  Firm resettlement and refoulement 
intersect primarily in the concept of “chain refoulement,” which 
arises when countries return refugees “to countries where 
protection against non-refoulement is not ensured, or to countries 
which may refuse entry, and which may refoule such persons to 
the country where they fear persecution.”134  According to the 
proponents of the “formal offer” approach, the “totality of the 
circumstances” test will not prevent chain refoulement and might 
cause a refugee to be removed to a country where there are no 
guarantees that the person will not be removed therewith.135  
However, this argument does not take into consideration that the 
“totality of the circumstances” approach would—in such a 
situation—consider the danger of refoulement as a determinative 
factor when determining firm resettlement.  The existence of a 
“formal offer” of official residency or refugee status is the principal 
inquiry made by the “totality of the circumstances” approach and 
the one that is given the most weight in the analysis. 
A guarantee against the third country refusing entry or later 
 
 131.  Refugee Convention, supra note 16, at art. 1(E) (emphasis added). 
 132.  Id.  Non-refoulement has been defined in a number of international 
refugee instruments, both at the universal and regional levels; at the 
universal level, the most important provision in this respect is Article 33 (1) 
of the Refugee Convention.  This provision states:  "No Contracting State 
shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion."  Refugee Convention, supra note 16, at art. 33(1).  
 133.  See Norris, supra note 130, at 442. 
 134.  UNHCR, An Overview of Protection Issues in Europe:  Legislative 
Trends and Positions taken by UNHCR, 1 EUROPEAN SERIES, Sept. 1995, 
at 96, available at http://www.unhcr.org/46e65e1e2.html.  
 135.  See Norris, supra note 130, at 442. 
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deporting the applicant to the country where he or she fears 
persecution is needed in order to satisfy the burden of proof that 
the government carries in the “totality of the circumstances” 
approach. In fact, the “formal offer” approach and the framework 
established by the BIA in Matter of A-G-G- present the same flaw 
that the proponents of the “formal offer” approach criticize.136  
Both approaches allow for a finding of firm resettlement without 
evidence of a direct offer in certain instances.137 
The proponents of the “formal offer” approach also argue that 
an assessment of a refugee’s circumstances “modif[ies] and 
marginalize[s]” the principal question of firm resettlement.138  
However, an approach for firm resettlement that looks only for a 
formal offer and does not take into account an applicant’s intent, 
length of stay in the first country of asylum, and the living 
conditions in the third country overlooks and oversimplifies the 
purpose of the firm resettlement bar. 
Opponents of the “totality of circumstances” approach have 
articulated concerns that such an approach wastes judicial 
resources, puts an undue burden on the applicant, 
and gives judges too much leeway leading to inconsistent 
results.139  While too much discretion for judges could lead to 
inconsistent results, too little discretion makes it impossible for 
judges to make decisions about whether the refugee enjoyed rights 
similar to those given to local persons in the country of asylum.  
Thus, too little discretion allows the immigration system in the 
U.S. to fall short of international obligations under the 1951 
Refugee Convention.  A “totality of circumstances” approach would 
undoubtedly require more effort in gathering circumstantial 
evidence, but such a fact-finding process is also a necessary part of 
the “formal offer” approach.  The role of judges is to evaluate the 
facts of individual cases, which are never the same.  It would 
make little difference in the overall burden on judges if, in 
addition to looking for an offer of resettlement, judges were guided 
 
 136.  Id. (noting that it may be argued that the direct offer approach and 
the new In re A-G-G- framework suffer from this same flaw, given that both 
approaches allow for a finding of firm resettlement without evidence of a 
direct offer in certain instances).  
 137.  See id. 
 138.  See Robert D. Sloane, An Offer of Firm Resettlement, 36 GEO. WASH. 
INT'L L. REV. 47, 60 (2004). 
 139.  See id. at 63–64. 
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to consider other specific circumstances or factors. 
The main reason for many courts—and recently the BIA—to 
employ an offer-based test for determining resettlement is to 
simplify the question of firm resettlement.  Judges want “helpful 
and comprehensive standards that [they] can use in their 
consideration of whether a petition for asylum can be granted or 
not.”140 However, a strictly offer-based evaluation is not 
necessarily comprehensive.  In some cases, looking only at 
concrete offers of residency could even neglect evidence that might 
not otherwise bar an asylum seeker. 
C. The Totality Of The Circumstances Approach Applied To 
Colombian Refugees 
Based on the regulations followed by DHS, a U.S. adjudicator 
does not look at the living conditions of the refugee applying for 
resettlement in the U.S. until the resettlement applicant applies 
for a waiver of the “firm resettlement” finding previously made by 
the adjudicator.  The regulations followed by DHS largely emulate 
the “formal offer” approach carried out by the BIA and the 
majority of the U.S. Court of Appeals circuits.  However, the 
“totality of the circumstances” approach, discussed supra, is the 
best solution for Colombian refugees currently residing in 
Ecuador, and the best approach to the firm resettlement 
inquiry.141  Unlike the “formal offer” approach followed by the 
Ninth Circuit, courts following the “totality of the circumstances” 
would consider: 
. . . the existence of a government-issued offer as simply 
one component of a broader firm resettlement inquiry 
according to the equal weight to such factors as the 
 
 140.  Matthew J. Fery, Note, Determining Better Standards for Firm 
Resettlement, Judicial Discretion, and Immigration Administrative 
Practice:  Diallo v. Aschcroft, 381 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2004), 31 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 505, 506 (2006). 
 141.  The alternative to this approach, would be the “formal offer” 
approach followed by the Ninth circuit and a couple of others, under which 
Colombian refugees residing in Ecuador would be automatically barred from 
being resettled in the U.S. because of the refugee status recognition made by 
the Ecuadorian government.  See Dana R. Green, Note, Navigating North: 
How the Canadian Approach to Firm Resettlement Should Guide U.S. 
Implementation of the Refugee Conventions, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 701, 
705–06 (2009).  
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alien’s length of stay in a third country, the economic and 
social ties that the alien develops in that country, and the 
alien’s intent . . .142 
For many of the Colombian refugees living in the 
circumstances described by the Georgetown Report, a 
consideration of the totality of their circumstances would allow 
them to defeat the “firm resettlement” bar that currently 
precludes them from resettling in the United States.143  Consider 
the case of the dozens of Colombian female refugees who have 
been sexually exploited by the Ecuadorian authorities and 
community members—clearly these refugees have not been given 
the same legal guarantees and protections that their Ecuadorian 
counterparts enjoy; additionally, the lack of government 
assistance given to these refugees further prevents them from 
ever locally integrating into the Ecuadorian population.144 
And, not only females refugees would be able to be resettled in 
the U.S. under the “totality of the circumstances” approach.  
Resettlement would be available to all Colombian refugees whose 
lives were threatened by local police officers, by Colombian armed 
groups who crossed the Ecuadorian border, and by other armed 
local groups who are affiliated with guerillas in Colombia.145  
Furthermore, all refugees who are victims of systematic 
discrimination by the Ecuadorian government and community 
would also likely be able to show under the “totality of the 
circumstances” approach that they have not had enough social and 
economic ties, educational opportunities, and government 
assistance and therefore are (or should be) eligible for 
resettlement in the U.S. 
Observers involved with international migration to the U.S. 
have suggested two goals that any asylum system should 
accomplish.146  First, asylum should protect the persecuted or 
seriously endangered.147  Second, asylum should deter abuse of 
 
 142.  Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 2001).  
 143.  See generally The Georgetown Report, supra note 1. 
 144.  See id. 
 145.  See generally id.   
 146.  Susan F. Martin & Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Asylum in Practice: 
Successes, Failures, and the Challenges Ahead, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 589, 
589–90 (2000). 
 147.  Id. at 589–90. 
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the privileges and resources afforded to U.S. residents.148  A more 
detailed approach to the firm resettlement bar helps to protect the 
truly desperate and to exclude those that have been offered 
protection elsewhere.149  Adoption of the “totality of the 
circumstances” into DHS’s regulations would not open the door for 
all Colombian refugees residing in Ecuador to resettle in the 
United States.  Rather, it would only allow protecting the truly 
desperate ones.  The “totality of the circumstances” analysis 
implements a comparison with the living conditions that 
Ecuadorian citizens have in Ecuador.  If Colombian refugees are 
facing similar conditions to the ones experienced by their 
Ecuadorian counterparts, then they would not be eligible to 
resettle in the U.S.150 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For some Colombian refugees, local integration is a durable 
solution currently available.  For others, return to Colombia could 
be a future solution if adequate conditions materialize.  But, for 
many others, resettlement in a third country is the only option to 
achieve protection.  While the Ecuadorian government has taken 
steps to provide refugee status to many Colombians, there are 
certain highly vulnerable persons within this population for whom 
the status granted by Ecuador provides neither a durable solution 
nor physical protection. 
To be true to the statutory text and to honor the purpose of 
asylum, courts should adopt the “totality of circumstances” 
approach for determining resettlement with the change that a 
formal offer be the first factor considered and given most weight.  
In this way, courts are to look first for an offer, but must also 
consider other attendant and important circumstances.  The 
existence or absence of a formal offer should not be dispositive, but 
should be merely the starting point for determining whether the 
alien is deserving of asylum protections. 
The case of Colombian refugees is only one example of the 
 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  See Maharaj v. Gonzalez, 450 F.3d 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2006) (reciting 
reasons why some courts have followed the totality of circumstances 
approach to find firm resettlement). 
 150.  That is, unless these Colombian refugees have faced a new type of 
persecution while living in Ecuador.     
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flaws of the “formal offer” approach.  The adoption of the “totality 
of the circumstances” approach would be a way to allow the 
Colombian refugees who have not yet been provided with a 
durable solution or physical protection in Ecuador to be resettled 
in the United States.  Moreover, the adoption of the “totality of the 
circumstances” approach would allow other refugees in the world, 
living under similar circumstances to the Colombians in Ecuador, 
to truly benefit from the protections accorded by the Refugee 
Convention.151 
Since the adoption of the Refugee Convention in 1951, the 
U.S. Government has traditionally opened its doors to persons 
who legitimately face persecution in their home countries.  
Colombian refugees currently residing in Ecuador have not only 
faced persecution in their home country, but they have also 
experienced perverse discrimination in their country of asylum.  
The United States should not reject them.  Under the “totality of 
the circumstances” approach followed by the Second, Fourth, 
Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, these Colombian refugees would 
be able to finally call a country their home.152 
 
 
 151.  Another group of refugees who would likely benefit from the 
adoption of the totality of the circumstances approach are Haitian refugees, 
many of whom currently reside in the Dominican Republic.  For a discussion 
of this distinct issue, see e.g., Eleanor Acer, Refuge in an Insecure Time: 
Seeking Asylum in the Post-9/11 United States, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1361 
(2005).  
 152.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(a).  
